Quantum key distribution: BB84, E91, security proofs, device independence
Every secure website you use agrees a secret key with mathematics that Shor’s algorithm would break. Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers something different: a key whose secrecy follows from the laws of physics, because measuring an unknown quantum state disturbs it, and the disturbance can be detected. The theory is beautiful and the proofs are rigorous. Real systems have nonetheless been hacked, not through the physics but through the hardware that implements it.
On the plate: you are Eve. Try to read Alice’s key without Bob noticing.
BB84
Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard proposed the first protocol in 1984. Alice sends single photons, each encoding a random bit in a randomly chosen basis: rectilinear (0° or 90°) or diagonal (45° or 135°). Bob measures each in a random basis. Afterwards they announce bases, not bits, over a public channel and keep only the rounds where the bases matched: the sifted key, about half the photons. They sacrifice a sample to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER). By no-cloning (Chapter 102), Eve cannot copy the photons; any measurement in the wrong basis randomizes them. Established
Play Eve
Intercept a fraction 0.50 of the photons, measure each in a random basis, and resend what you saw. Then . Half the time you guess the wrong basis; then Bob’s result is random, wrong half of those times. Intercepting everything gives a QBER of . Below a QBER of 11%, error correction and privacy amplification (hashing the key down to a shorter one that Eve knows almost nothing about) still leave a secret key at rate per sifted bit, where is the binary entropy. Peter Shor and John Preskill proved this in 2000 against any attack Eve can make, by relating BB84 to an error-corrected entanglement-distillation protocol. Real keys also need finite-size corrections, reviewed by Christopher Portmann and Renato Renner in 2022. Established
Hacking the hardware, and device independence
In 2010 Lars Lydersen and colleagues blinded the single-photon detectors of commercial QKD systems with bright light, turning them into classical detectors that Eve could control remotely. She obtained the full key with no rise in QBER. The proofs assumed devices behaved as modelled; they did not.
Artur Ekert’s 1991 protocol uses entangled pairs and a Bell test (Chapter 51). Its descendant, device-independent QKD, certifies security from the observed CHSH value alone, treating the devices as black boxes. With a QBER of 0.020 the plate plots the key rate . In 2022 David Nadlinger and colleagues at Oxford ran it with trapped ions, distilling 95,628 key bits from 1.5 million Bell pairs. In 2026 Bo-Wei Lu, Jian-Wei Pan and colleagues at USTC reported in Science device-independent QKD between two single-atom nodes linked by 100 km of fibre. Whether QKD is worth deploying, given its cost and the need for trusted relays, rather than post-quantum cryptography (Chapter 133), is argued among security agencies. Debated
What you now have
BB84 and sifting, QBER, the intercept–resend attack and its 25% signature, the Shor–Preskill bound and its 11% threshold, privacy amplification, detector blinding, E91 and device-independent QKD with its key-rate formula.
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Three questions to carry with you.
And one to work out. Eve intercepts and resends every photon in a random basis. What QBER results?
Sources: C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, 175 (1984). A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991). P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000). L. Lydersen et al., Nat. Photon. 4, 686 (2010). S. Pironio et al., New J. Phys. 11, 045021 (2009). D. P. Nadlinger et al., Nature 607, 682 (2022). C. Portmann and R. Renner, Rev. Mod. Phys. 94, 025008 (2022). T. Vidick and S. Wehner, Introduction to Quantum Cryptography (CUP, 2023). B.-W. Lu et al., Science 391, 592 (2026). Checked by code: 1 − 2h(Q) reaches zero at Q = 0.1101; DI rate at S = 2.7, Q = 0.02 is 0.587.